Again, when we perceive an object a second time, and recognize it as the same object which was previously perceived, we manifest another idea, which could not have been acquired—that of similarity. This idea, like that of similarity, could not have been conceived as a separate idea; for in that case it would either have grown out of the first conception of the object, or it would have been communicated to the mind after the first and previous to the second perception of the object, or, finally, it would have arisen from the idea of similarity, previously existing in the mind. It could not have grown out of the first conception of the object; for, identity being that quality in virtue of which anything, as an individual object, continues to be the same thing that it was previously perceived, and as the external form and appearance of an object, by means of which we form a conception of it, may change without destroying the identity of the object, if our idea of identity grew out of or communicated to the object it would correspond with that conception, and as the second conception would be different from the first according to the change which has taken place in the object, that idea would not correspond with the second conception, and hence, we would not be able to identify the object or recognize it as the same which was previously perceived. Yet we know by experience that we can and do recognize objects in such circumstances. Therefore our idea of identity must be independent of our conceptions, and could not have grown out of them.

Secondly, we could not have been communicated to the mind prior to the first and second conceptions of the object; for since it is independent of our conceptions of external objects it would require a separate and distinct conception of the object it would correspond with the second conception, and consequently could be acquired only by the aid of our idea of similarity, like other conceptions. But that our idea of similarity may be a legitimate standard by which to determine the correctness of our conceptions, the mind must necessarily recognize the identity of that idea with itself. Hence, to acquire the idea of similarity by conception, we require the idea of identity itself as a necessary condition. Consequently, in the supposition that it was acquired, it would exist as an idea and exist at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore it was not acquired by conception.

Finally, it could not arise from the idea of similarity; for, in this hypothesis, it is evident that the idea of identity could not pertain to the essence of an object, since it did not exist in the soul prior to its production by the idea of similarity, and hence, a conception of the new idea would be necessary to render it an actual possession of the soul. But we have already seen that the idea of identity is involved in the process of conception. Hence, it follows that in the hypothesis of production from the idea of similarity the same contradiction of existence and non-existence at the same time would result. Therefore, the idea of identity does not arise from that of similarity. Consequently, there being no source from which it could arise as an acquired idea, we must conclude that it is innate in the soul, and independent of experience.

Passing now to the second degree of knowledge (or cognition), we see more clearly the necessity of innate ideas. We have said that cognition is a knowledge not only of an object as an individual thing, but also of its several parts, qualities, and their mutual relations. This species of knowledge consists of many separate conceptions united into one act of knowing precisely by the affirmation of one act of relating between them. Now, if, as we have seen, the existence of innate ideas must be admitted as a preliminary to the formation of a single concept, it is equally necessary to admit it as a preliminary to the formation of the several concepts which go to make up a cognition. This is so evident that it needs no proof. Moreover, the unifying of these separate conceptions into one act of knowing, brings to light a distinct idea, which must have existed in the mind prior to the first act of cognition, and that is the idea of relation, or the natural correspondence or affinity of this idea, for instance, can affirm that several objects of perception are related to one another as parts of the same whole, unless I have an idea of relation ? I never think of affirming that a house, a dog, a chicken, etc., are parts of one and the same object, but I unhesitatingly declare that the walls, the doors, the roof, etc., are parts of a single object known as a house. Why do I refrain from an affirmation in the first case and not in the second? Because I see, I know, that in the first case there exists no natural affinity between the objects named; and in the second case I can truly say that there is such an affinity. Consequently, I must necessarily have an idea of relation prior to my first act of cognition. It might be shown, in the same way as for the idea of identity, that this idea of relation could not be an acquired idea, and hence that it is innate.

In the third degree, or intellection, our innate ideas are the only basis of all that is peculiar in this species of knowledge; for intellection being the result of that process of thought or reasoning by which the mind is enabled to infer with certainty the existence of a substance or essence, (which can never become the object of sense perception), from a perception of modifications or phenomena, that which is peculiar in intellection is the knowledge of substance or essence. Now as these can never fall under the senses, it follows that the mind can never conceive of them through the senses; for the senses can furnish ideas only of those objects which are submitted to them. Hence, the mind must either look for its ideas of substance and essence in its own essence, or it must receive them directly from the Creator at a time subsequent to its creation; it cannot receive them directly from the Creator at a time subsequent to its creation; for in this hypothesis these ideas are either infused into the soul and thus made a part of its essence, or they are simply presented to the soul, and by it appropriated by an act of conception. They could not be infused into the soul as essential elements, for the simple reason that the addition of such elements would change the nature of the soul, and that which was previously the image of God would cease to be such; or rather it would argue that the soul was not previously the image of God, since it did not represent two of His principal attributes. Finally, these ideas could not have been acquired by conception; for supposing it depends of these ideas, which constitute the idea of reality, it would have no idea of reality, and consequently could have no idea of the reality of its own existence nor of the idea of similarity; which is a necessary prerequisite of every conception, and hence it could not make the idea of similarity (of which it has no idea) the basis of a conception. Therefore, according to this hypothesis, it would be impossible to acquire ideas of substance and essence, or reality.

But we know that we possess these ideas. Therefore they belong to the nature of the soul, and are innate.

We see, therefore, that it would be impossible to acquire knowledge in any of its three degrees without the pre-existence in the mind of at least some ideas which must have been co-existent with the mind itself, and therefore innate, since in any other supposition they could never become known to the mind. Now, since thought and reasoning are nothing else than the intellectual process by which cognition and intellection (so far as the mind is capable of intellection in its present state of existence) are acquired; and since these two species of knowledge would be impossible without innate ideas, it follows that thought and reasoning, as intellectual and intelligent operations, would likewise be impossible. Therefore, the proposition which we set out to prove is established, and the necessity of innate ideas is demonstrated by the intrinsic evidence of the fact. The same is supported by the testimony of divine revelation. Therefore, we are forced to admit the real existence of innate ideas.

The great difficulty of philosophers on this subject, arises, as we have said, from the fact that it is almost impossible to make the soul the object of an immediate study, and from the other fact that, in the order of our experience, a perception and conscious knowledge of external things precedes the distinct consciousness of many principles. To explain the acquisition of knowledge, all philosophers are obliged to admit some inherent intellectual power in the soul; but they fail to go to the root of the matter and inquire into the nature of that power and the basis of its operations. Forgetting, moreover, the object of the soul's creation, and its necessary concomitants, and knowing that sense knowledge comes first in the order of experience, rejecting the ontological order and following only that of experience, they shirk the labor of thorough investigation and jump at the conclusion that, as our mental development and the acquisition of knowledge begins with the senses, all our ideas, whatever be their nature, must also come to us through the medium of the senses. Hence they believe that the existence of any ideas prior to experience? They invent theories and modifications, making at the same time the soul the vehicle of the ideas rather than the ideas the essence of the soul.
tions of theories in support of this over-hasty conclusion; but their explanations are not only unnecessary, but even unsatisfactory to themselves, as they cannot change the mind of those who deny or explicitly or implicitly, the existence of innate ideas. Either we have innate ideas, or we have not: if we have not, then all our ideas are acquired. If acquired, they come to the mind through the intellect alone, or through the senses alone, or finally through the senses and intellect, acting together. They cannot come through the intellect alone; for, to acquire an idea, the prior existence of at least one other idea (of that of similarity) must be taken for granted, and hence must have existed prior to experience, or the presence in the mind of the first acquired idea. They cannot come from the senses alone; for the senses can furnish ideas only of those things which are the objects of sense perception; but phenomena or appearances of sense perception, if any, are not innate ideas; hence, the senses cannot furnish ideas of reality, of substance, essence, and relations, which, nevertheless, we know exist in the mind. Therefore we must come from the intellect.

They cannot come from the senses and the intellect acting conjointly: for as the senses furnish the ideas of phenomena and nothing more, the duty of the intellect will be to supply the ideas of reality and of the relation between reality and phenomena. But we suppose that the intellect has not those ideas prior to experience or the senses alone, and we have seen that the intellect cannot acquire them by its own independent effort without supposing the prior existence of another idea, nor through the senses, nor as being conscious that which it does not itself possess and is incapable of acquiring, the intellect, in the supposed case, could not supply the ideas of reality and relation, and hence a knowledge of those would be impossible.

But we know that our knowledge.

Hence, these ideas are in the mind, and not being acquired, must be there by nature, or innate. In order to be easily we have not the extrinsic view of the doctrine of innate ideas, which would hold that all ideas, without exceptions, are innate, and that what are usually termed acquired ideas, by which is understood ideas of contingent things, are not really acquired, but simply special combinations of the ideas which are innate in the soul. There may, indeed, be some foundation for this view, but as that foundation (supposing it to exist) is not quite evident to us, we prefer the theory which admits that our ideas of contingent things and particular facts, are really acquired, while our ideas of necessary truths and the eternal, fundamental principles are innate in the soul. Hence, we have confined our defence of the doctrine of innate ideas within the limits of absolute truth and primary principles. We have pointed out various ideas which must be presupposed in the mind in order that the acquisition of knowledge may be possible: we might mention more, but it is not necessary to do so, since if we have established the necessity of some such ideas, yet, even of one, we have, by the very fact, justified our theory, and the enumeration of these innate ideas, which exist in the present order of things is a mere matter of detail.

It remains now for us, before entering upon a critical examination of the leading theories on this subject, to explain the present theory in general order, both for the purpose of giving a clear view of the points which we defend, and also to furnish the key to our subsequent criticism of the theories of others.

First, then, (1) We hold that the human soul is, and was at the time of its creation, the image of God. (2) That, as such, it represents and then represented God as He is, and, consequently, that it represents and then represented all that is essential to God, as a simple essential in God, and indivisible, and must be represented as He is or not at all. (3) That as all absolute truths and the first principles of all knowledge are essential in God, the soul, or the intellect, must bear in itself the representatives [ideas] of these essential truths and first principles, and that from the instant it became the image of God, or from its very creation. (4) That as the essence of nature of a being corresponds invariably and necessarily with the end or object of its being, and as the object of the soul's creation, or of its being, was to be the image of God, those ideas of essential truths and first principles, without which the soul would not, and could not, be the image of God, are essential in the soul, and are therefore properly and truly innate in the soul, just as the realities, which they represent, are essential in the nature of God Himself. (5) That it is these ideas which constitute the intelligence of the soul, and chiefly distinguish it from other souls. There can be no doubt that intellectual power, so much talked of and so little understood, by which we acquire a knowledge of external things, and attain to a consciousness of purely intellectual principles of reason, that is, truths and principles which do not fall under the senses, is nothing else than that intelligence which depends for its existence upon the actual present or these original ideas of essentia truths and first principles. (6) That, therefore, without these or ginal ideas, there would be no intelligence in the soul, and consequently it could never acquire a rational knowledge of external things, nor attain to a conscious knowledge of any intellectual truth whatever. In a word, our souls would be like those of the horse, the dog, and other animals, active, indeed, as every spiritual is being by nature, but void of intelligence and the power of reflex thought. Hence, we conclude and maintain that the soul has some ideas prior to all experience, and truly innate.

These points we have already established by arguments which we cannot unanswerable. Yet to enforce those arguments and place our system upon a still more firm basis, we must confound the fallacy of explaining the failure of his explanation, look upon him as the earliest defender of innate ideas, because he really announced the true theory when he claimed that rational ideas exist in the mind prior to experience, or that man is born into this life with these ideas; for, had he not been misled by imagination in supposing a prior state of existence of the soul, he would have been obliged to seek another explanation of these ideas, and, rejecting this prior state of existence, they cannot be explained except on the ground that they are innate. However, although Plato really did furnish the groundwork of the theory of innate ideas, we cannot properly class him among the actual defenders of that theory, since, according to his explanation, the failure of his explanation, look upon him as the earliest defender of innate ideas, because he really announced the true theory when he claimed that rational ideas exist in the mind prior to experience, or that man is born into this life with these ideas; for, had he not been misled by imagination in supposing a prior state of existence of the soul, he would have been obliged to seek another explanation of these ideas, and, rejecting this prior state of existence, they cannot be explained except on the ground that they are innate. 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It is quite evident that the admission of this last point, Aristotle's theory, would completely destroy the natural intelligence of the soul; for if the soul has not by nature the faculty of judging and reasoning, it cannot be by nature intelligent, since everything that Aristotle sets down not as the act of judgment and reasoning is precisely the power of judging and reasoning. From this it would follow that the human soul is by nature nothing more than the mere animal soul. But then there is this communication of the divine understanding, as we must do, since it would destroy the distinctive character of the soul as a being intelligent by nature, the active intellect would be more than the simple act which we term activity; and rejecting further, the existence of primary ideas in the soul, we necessarily run into the grossest sensanism, which finds its legitimate exponents in the theory of nominalism. That this would be the logical consequence of Aristotle's theory, directed of this indubitable feature, is evident from the fact that, by that theory, a knowledge of reality would be utterly impossible: for, suppose the soul possessed only of the faculties of sensibility and activity, (active and active intellect,) without any other knowledge, it should necessarily be required by these two faculties. But, according to Aristotle, the active intellect merely judges and reasons upon the data received in the passive intellect, and the latter may be asked, by the way, how the active intellect does this? Now the passive intellect receives these data only through the senses, and the senses can furnish only what they perceive. But we are already shown that the senses can perceive only phenomena or appearances. Hence, only phenomena or rather their representative, can be received by the passive intellect, nor can the ideas of reality and relation be contained in those of phenomena; for phenomena are less than reality, and the less cannot contain the greater. Whence, it follows, that the active intellect, reasoning upon those ideas, can discern only in the way they contain, and, therefore, the mind can never discover the ideas of reality, relation, etc., from its ideas of phenomena, and, consequently, can have no knowledge of reality at all. Hence the notions or ideas which we think we have of realities, are unreal—mere fancies, and the terms which we use to express these notions are mere empty words which have no corresponding reality. This is briefly the doctrine of nominalism, which destroys all reality, even that of our own existence. As, therefore, the reason, by which Aristotle sought to explain the sensation of the human mind in accordance with his theory is unfounded and unsound, and as his theory, without that support, leads to the most absurd results, we are forced to reject it entirely.

A Glance at the Literature of the Day.

The literature of our day takes a large range in which to develop itself. The subjects on which it treats are almost without number, and it endeavors to conform itself to the most delicate and the greatest capacities, to the superficial and the profoundest minds, to the vulgar, and the highly polished tastes. But the taste of the public at large has been pampered to. It has been too much to delight French dishes to such an extent that good, wholesome English beef will no longer be tolerated. As the French cook endeavors with each succeeding sun to prepare a new dish, so the writers of the day expect their ready-made dish to excite the incidents of ordinary life. They do not hesitate to utter the most audacious sentiments that a sensation may be produced. They know that though a few good honest men may complain, yet the public at large will bear them the burden of the hour. But it is only for the hour. The taste to which they pander must have something else that is new. The next day another wears the laurels which on the day before adorned their brows.

We all know that when men refuse good, solid food, and eat only of splendid and delicate dishes, that his body is not in a healthy condition. But when a writer is not seeking after novelty in Literature show also an unhealthy state of mind? But people whose intellectual tastes are vitiated, whose appetites are deceived, are in the condition of consummation suffering from consumption. Though all persons see plainly that the almost incurable disease has attacked him, yet he cannot be convinced of this truth until it is far too late to take the proper measures to combat it successfully. So it is with depraved intellectual tastes. They read trashy novels, like philosophy and indelicate publications of all kinds. They see no great harm in all these. It is only a slight cold, so to speak. But it is consumption, and sooner or later their minds are hopelessly enfeebled. We do not think there is anything really strong and healthy in our Literature. Far from it. There are many good men who will not pander to bad taste and immorality. There are many authors who wish to be useful to their countrymen, and who lead their all in directing the thoughts of men in the right path. But the great mass of the people and writers, we are sorry to say, do not even read with these.

Let us take a cursory view of our authors and then judge them by their respective merits. In philosophy and science we have Herbert Spencer, Lockey, Darwin, Huxley, and others. We are almost sure to say that our philosophers and scientific men are divided into two schools the anti-Christian and the Catholic. To the former class belong the writers just mentioned,—to the latter belong Whism, Newton, Manning, Molley, Father Hewart and their Catholic fellow-laborers. To it also belong those Protestant writers who, seeing the errors of the anti-Christian school, endeavor to combat them. But to do this it is necessary for them to enter, for the time, the domain of Catholic reasoning. Outside of it they are powerless. But must Protestant writers side, it may be unconsciously, with the anti-Christian school? It is this fact that has forced Huxley to declare that their only enemy was the Catholic church; that as for the non-Catholics, they were mere fools and knaves.

Not content with developing truths firmly established, or with the discoveries of other grand truths proceeding from those already known, the anti-Chrisian or infidel philosopher and naturalist, does not belong to the incomprehensible school of the anti-Christian school, endeavor to combat them. For this it is necessary for them to enter, for the time, the domain of Catholic reasoning. Outside of it they are powerless. But must Protestant writers side, it may be unconsciously, with the anti-Christian school? It is this fact that has forced Huxley to declare that their only enemy was the Catholic church; that as for the non-Catholics, they were mere fools and knaves.

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But the greatest blame must be laid at the doors of the novelists of the day. What one among them, instead of the ordinary draw of a quiet life? Which one of us has taught us sound lessons in the matters of life? It is true that the virtuous always come out victorious at the last. But does not the author paint himself the villain in such a dress that the mind is almost forced to sympathize with him? The question was asked when Dickens died—who is now our greatest English novelist? Surely, neither Charles Reade, nor Thackeray, nor Collins, nor D'Irregular can lay claim to that honor. And now that Hawthorne is dead, what American is there who can claim to be his successor? The age demands novelty, and the novelists write for the age. No crimes are too great for these writers to depict in their works; no incidents too impossible. Is it to be wondered at that such a combination should attract attention? The five-fifths of the popular novels are of illegitimate birth? Yet such is the fact. With pleasure would we hail any novel by the realistic school, or recognize, for the generation of chaotic matter, an immense deposit of it would gradually dry up; after which the filament of fire being produced in the chaotic mass, by an idiosyncrasy, or self-produced habit analogous to force, would take place; some would be shot from the central chaos; planets from the suns, and satellites from planets. In this state of things the filament of organization would begin to exert itself in those independent masses which would separate from the bulk, exposed the greatest surface to the action of light and heat. This filament, after an infinite series of ages, would begin to ramify, and its viviparous offspring would diversify their forms and habits, so as to accommodate themselves to the various inequalities which nature had prepared for them. Upon this view of things it seems highly probable that the first efforts of nature terminated in the production of vegetable, and that these, being abandoned to their own energies, by degrees detached themselves from the sources of the earth, and supplied themselves with wings or feet, according as their different propensities determined them in favor of aerial or terrestrial existence. Others, by an ineradicable disposition to society and civilization, and by a stronger effort of volition, would become men. These, in time, would restrict themselves to the use of their hind feet; their tails would gradually rub off by sitting in their caves or huts as soon as they arrived at a domesticated state; they would invent language and the use of fire, with our present and hitherto imperfect system of society. In their growth, the Fue, and Align, with the Corallines and Madrepores, would transform themselves and gradually populate all the submarine portion of the globe.

[The above is about as lucid and intelligible as ninety-nine-hundredths of the learned nonsense following on the public under the specious name of "science"]

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**NOTRE DAME SCHOLASTIC.**

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**A Snow-squall on the 15th.** All sermons on the 16th.

We hear with regret that Rev. Father Lemonier was detained several days in Austin, Texas, by illness.

**Rev. Father Provincial.** Left here on Friday for Cincinnati, to be present at the consecration of the new cathedral of Bishop of Fort Wayne.

**Several men** are energetically at work, cleaning up the College premises. This is all that is needed to be done. The summer costs have been heavy.

**Mr. Pine,** leader, and the industry of the young band, makes the best time between the University, St. Mary's, and St. Louis. We were delighted to see Rev. Father Calliet, and regret he did not stop longer.

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**Card of Thanks.**

We, the members of the Notre Dame University Cornet Band, tender our sincere thanks to our very worthy President, Mr. G. M. Stearns, for his kindness in exercising such influence over us, and for his kind interest in all our concerns. We are equally indebted to the Good Counsel and patience of Rev. Father Milly, leader, and the industry of the young gentlemen under his direction. May their lives be as harmonious as the excellent piece to which we have just listened, and may they begin to realize that, as in the olden times, they are the princes of the earth, and will appreciate them (substantially) as did Mr. Chirhart.

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**The Accommodation Train.**

We are glad to see that our favorite train is again on the M. & S. L. R. R., and accommodates the wayfarers between Elkhart and Chicago. The accommodation train goes out South Bend at 6:30 A.M., Cleveland time.

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**China Wedding.**

Mr. and Mrs. McPherson, formerly of Chicago, celebrated, on Tuesday evening, the twentieth anniversary of their wedding. Many friends from South Bend, Notre Dame and St. Mary's were present on the happy occasion, and the evening was spent most pleasantly.

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**The "Philosophian Standard."**

The second number of this neat and sparsely jewel journal is on our table. The cover is the finest specimen of workmanship that we have seen on any College paper. The interior corresponds pretty well with the cover. The columns, in general, are neatly and legibly written, and even when the impress of Doctor McIlhenny's hand is seen in the border character of the choreography all is still legible and pleasing to the eye. The articles are worthy of being recorded in fine style and emblazoned in such a fine cover. The Phantom, by Delta, is worthy of the first place it holds. The local notes are to the point, —especially the remarks about the Ball-salia. It receives the attention it merits. The historical department is taken up by an essay on the literary character of Julius Caesar. The Philosopher Society is announced. Cheerfulness, by C. A. B., shows the utter uselessness of putting a long face on over matters and things. Field sports fill up several columns. We clip A Slant Explanation from the columns, which shows the Whereupon to our How. Altogether, we think No. 2 an improvement on No. 1, and that is saying a good deal without puffing.

The pages, we would observe, should be numbered.

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**NOTRE DAME SCHOLASTIC.**

*Published every Week during Term Time, at NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY.*

All communications should be sent to Editors SCHOLASTIC, Notre Dame, Indiana.

[Note: The table and other content remains unchanged as per the original format.]
HONORABLE MENTIONS.

CLASSICAL COURSE.
Fourth Year (Seniors)—T. Ireland, M. Keesey, M. Mahoney, J. McHugh.
Third Year (Juniors)—M. Foote, E. B. Gamble, J. Hoar.
First Year (Freshmen)—W. Clarke, C. Dodge, L. Hayes, M. Maloney.

SCIENTIFIC COURSE.
Fourth Year (Seniors)—N. S. Mitchell, T. O'Mahony.
Third Year (Juniors)—T. Dundon, P. O'Connell.
Second Year (Sophomores)—R. J. Curran, F. P. Leffingwell.
First Year (Sophomores)—T. J. Murphy, C. M. Proctor, J. H. Gillespie, J. M. Rourke.

COMMERCIAL COURSE.

PREPARATORY COURSE.

THE PHILOLOGISTS.
Mr. Editor: Some weeks have passed since the Philologists sent you a report for publication. But I trust that this has not caused you or the many readers of the Scholastic to think that these few days of warm and sunny weather have caused a lack in that life and energy which have characterized the Association during the present year; but, rather, it is owing to the fact that I did not deem it necessary, before responding to their request, to prepare a report sent to be published in the columns of the Scholastic; and I trust that this, together with the fact that May is near at hand, our meetings will be less frequented. And, though a sufficient apology if, in preparing this report, I may seem to extend it beyond the usual length. The last meeting was an interesting and important one, and one that reflected credit not only on those who took part in the exercises of the evening, but also upon the Society and the members there assembled.

The meeting was called to order by our much-respected President, Professor Stace. The preliminary business was gone through without incident, and the debate, and it is of this especially that I wish to speak. Question: 

Resolved, That the Stesian be more beneficial to society than either the Warrior or the Poet.

The debate was opened in few but appetizing words by Mr. Carr, and the manner in which he defended the statesman, showed that it was a subject with which his readings had made him familiar. Though we have seen a great many debates during our connection with the Society, still, seldom if ever have we seen a debate opened more creditably. Mr. Carr was followed by Mr. Ireland, who ascended the rostrum and proceeded to develop the arguments of the negative. His speech was "short and sweet." Mr. Gamble then endeavored to shock some of the arguments of the negative and advance new ones. After he had occupied the stand for a few moments, during which time he certainly said enough for the arguments he advanced, then came Mr. Dehner, who showed us that it was a question upon which it had read, and thought he failed to manifest that point that a stage which often affects in itself the Society room, still he contributed very much to convince us of the beneficence exercised by the warrior and the poet. Having thus vindicated his side of the question, in a manner painless to himself, he resumed his seat to listen to the closing speech by Mr. Carr and lend applause to the decision of the "chair.

As we have said, the closing speech was by Mr. Carr, who, though he spoke with credit to himself and the Society at the beginning, seemed to have been stirred up by the arguments opposed him; so much so that he not only entered with philosophic accuracy into the nature and bearing of the arguments of the negative, but also spoke in a manner that elicited great applause and won the undivided attention of those assembled.

Next in the "natural order of things," came the reading of the "Owl." A long account of this paper is not here necessary, as it has been often spoken of in the columns of the Scholastic. While some have praised and complimented it, others have shot at it, and one holb seems to have stirred up by the announcement of the "clove water" on it, but his good nature caused him to take another, a second thought, and desist from doing anything that might cause it to have the chills, for he understands that he has had himself and knows how to appreciate them.

After the reading of the "Owl," on motion, the meeting adjourned and hastened to the arms of Morpheus and sweet repose.

I am, Mr. Editor, yours respectfully,

E. B. GAMBLE, C.E., '98.

THE NOTRE DAME SCHOLASTIC.

NOTRE DAME PHILOMATHIC ASSOCIATION.

The thirty-third regular meeting of this Association was held April 10th.

After the usual preliminaries, Mark Foote arose and read the following articles from the "Philologus Standard":


After this, C. Dodge gave us the "Gladiator" in a spirited manner. C. Berkel followed with "Ladies' Letters," in his usual style. J. Ireland came next in the "Blue and the Gray," which was excellently given, and was received with rounds of applause. M. Foote's "Bill and I" was very pathetic. F. Egan's "Pariahs" was light.
Instead of censure activity, we should be thankful for the example which teaches us how much can be accomplished by industry in a short time. But lest we might think that an early death is sure to be the consequence, we need but turn over the pages of history to dispose of such a notion.

Sir Walter Scott died at the age of 01; Edward Burke, 80; Dr. Samuel Johnson, 80; Washington Irving, 02; and we turn to the lives of the Saints, it would appear that incessant labor was the sole promoter of a long life. But we think it is evident that a laborious life is by no means a short one.

**Fame.**

[From the "Philosophic Ovrl."]

Great military chieftains rise up, and by their skill, judgment and foresight cause the very earth to tremble; but their glory is temporal, and in a few generations they are lost to popular recollection, history alone preserving their names and handing them down to posterity. How very different with those who use the laborious life and fame of their author to the end of time. Behold Milton and Shakespeare, each succeeding generation chanting their praises; and still in their own time they were not much admired, and now, like the works of Homer, Virgil, and others, they have a prominent place in every library and every cottage.

In our admiration of their works we lose sight of the men, and their personal history is involved in great obscurity. We are told that seven cities claimed the title of "Birthplace of Homer," and the every century of his birth is a matter of dispute; some holding that it was 182 B.C., while others place it five hundred years later, and say that he was born in 674 B.C., and in fact we are able to point out no circumstance in his life with anything like certainty; this led Wolf and others to deny that such a man as Homer ever existed; but though their arguments have been refuted, they still are very satisfactorily, still there is a doubt thrown upon the existence of Homer which it will take ages entirely to erase. With the history of the others we are more conversant, because they lived in ages when civilization and refinement were the characteristics of their nations; when history had taken form and shape, and of the four great writers we have mentioned they have been prominent in every literary and every company.

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were men who were to a great extent unconscious of their genius; for, had they been aware of their strength and "taken more than their shoulders could bear," One word more and we will dismiss this very important subject. Fame is honorable to be remembered; but he that I put my hands on my hips, and fairly advertised for the proud, but for the benefactors of mankind; and to these men love to pay their debt of gratitude in singing their praises and raising higher their fame. E. B. G.

Base-Ball.

There were two nines. These nines were antagonists. The ball is a pretty little drop of softness, size of a goose egg, and five degrees harder than a Pennsylvania Dutch potato. The pitcher throws two nines play against each other. It is a quiet game, much like chess, only a little more chase than chess.

There was an umpire. His position is a hard one. He sits on a box and yells "foul." His duty is severe.

Umpire said "play." It is the most meekly played I know of, this base-ball. Sawing cord-wood is cerolite was to light. I put up my

But I don't like 'em too hot for fun. After a while

the part of the job that made me indignant. But I thought of that before? Concluded to steer clear of yeast and use saleratus. Had a good time mixing the

I remember that to where the ball was aiming to deceed. I have a good eye to measure distances, and I saw at a glance where the little
test. The man said it was the ball. It felt like a mule, and I

sprayed ankles. Five swelled legs. One dislocated shoulder, from trying to throw a ball a thousand yards. Two hands raw from trying to stop hot balls. A lump the size of a hornet's nest on my left hip, well back. A generally jummed, and five uniforms spoiled from rolling in the dirt at the bases.

I have played twice, and don't think I like the game. I looked over the scorer's book, and find that I have broken several bats; made one tally, broken one umpire's jaw, broken ten windows in adjoining houses, killed a baby, smashed a kerouo lamp, broken the leg of a dog, mortally

knocked five other players out of time by slanging my bat, and knocked the waterfall from a school-mam who was standing twenty rails from the field a quiet looker-on.

What I Knew of Housekeeping.

Josephine—that's Mrs. O. Howr Green—which latter is myself—went to visit some of our cousins

and said it was the ball. A fly came toward me from the bat at the rate of nine miles a minute. I put up my hands—the fly sat on my face with all the skin from my palms with it. That was an eventful chap who first invented

base-ball. It's such fun. I've played games, and this is the result.

Twenty-seven dollars paid out for things. One bunged eye—badly bunged. One broken little finger. One bump on the head. Nineteen lame backs. A sore jaw. One thumb dislocated. Three splinted ankles. Five swelled legs. One dislocated shoulder, from trying to throw a ball a thousand yards. Two hands raw from trying to stop hot balls. A lump the size of a hornet's nest on my left hip, well back. A generally jummed, and five uniforms spoiled from rolling in the dirt at the bases.

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Josephine—that's Mrs. O. Howr Green—which latter is myself—went to visit some of our cousins German, descendants from the high-low Dutch.India, to add a new charm to the already

in the middle of the diminutive who was quietly taking its nap in his
dow, a kerosene lamp, and put up against the Lead

tian looker-on.

I made some. Forgetting the salt did make them

soiled, I laid them aside and took clean ones—lots of 'em, you know; but a day

When I came to count them. Ko use; there were

the part of the job that made me indignant. But I thought of that before? Concluded to steer clear of yeast and use saleratus. Had a good time mixing the

first shortcake—it's

SAINT MARY'S ACADEMY.

SAINT MARY'S ACADEMY.

April 16, 1873.

The latest object of special interest and admiration to the pupils is the new waterworks now being constructed in the picturesque glen east of the Academy by Mr. St. John, of South Bend. A tunnel nine and a half miles long, from the St. Joseph river, will throw the water of that river into the reservoirs of the old and the new buildings at the rate of 2,500 barrels per day, thus affording great facilities for adding to the comfort of the pupils, and increased security against fire, for on every story of both buildings the water-pipes are so arranged that a section of the main can be detached and put in prompt service by any one at hand, the hose being kept in a box built in the wall near each fixture. The connecting pipes leading to the reservoirs extend through the front grounds of the Academy, and at suitable points additional fountains will be introduced; also artificial lakes and cascades, to add a new scene to the already beautiful surroundings of St. Mary's. The pupils past and present, take much interest in the grand improvements now going on, and feel that they may justly pride themselves on being associated with these improvements and high refinement of St. Mary's Academy.
The "AVE MARIA"

A CATHOLIC JOURNAL, particularly devoted to the Holy Mother of God. Published weekly at Notre Dame University, Indiana, and encouraged and approved by the highness of the Church.

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Leaves敬请联系或留下您的联系方式以获取进一步的帮助。

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(Organization of Railways by Board of Railway Commissioners.)

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CHICAGO TO ST. LOUIS, Without Change of Cars.

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Time, only 11 Hours.

The time running Fullman Palace Sleeping Cars between Chicago and all points in Illinois and Indiana.


The Sisters of the Holy Cross, are situated on the St. Joe river, sixty-eight miles east of Chicago, via Michigan Southern Railway, and two miles from the shipping town of South Bend.

The use of the Ave Maria is not for sale, or for adoption to any other purposes, except by subscription to its past office.

St. Mary's Academy, Notre Dame, Ind.

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